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• Implementation can be challenging for teams lacking provenance expertise.
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a b s t r a c t
The provenance of a piece of data refers to knowledge about its origin, in terms of the entities and
actors involved in its creation, e.g. data sources used, operations carried out on them, and users enacting
those operations. Provenance is used to better understand the data and the context of its production,
and to assess its reliability, by asserting whether correct procedures were followed. Providing evidence
for validating research is of particular importance in the biomedical domain, where the strength of the
results depends on the data sources andprocesses used. In recent times, previouslymanual processes have
become fully or semi-automated, e.g. clinical trial recruitment, epidemiological studies, diagnosismaking.
The latter is typically achieved through interactions of heterogeneous software systems in multiple
settings (hospitals, clinics, academic and industrial research organisations). Provenance traces of these
software need to be integrated in a consistent and meaningful manner, but since these software systems
rarely share a common platform, the provenance interoperability between themhas to be achieved on the
level of conceptual models. It is a non-trivial matter to determine where to start in making a biomedical
software system provenance-aware. In this paper, we specify recommendations to developers on how
to approach provenance modelling, capture, security, storage and querying, based on our experiences
with two large-scale biomedical research projects: Translational Research and Patient Safety in Europe
(TRANSFoRm) and Electronic Health Records for Clinical Research (EHR4CR). While illustrated with
concrete issues encountered, the recommendations are of a sufficiently high level so as to be reusable
across the biomedical domain.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Provenance aims to capture the origin of some data through
details of the actions and actors involved in its creation. In scien-
tific applications, provenance helps us to understand research re-
sults [1]. For instance, a published clinical studymay contain a table
showing the statistical significance of some treatment on the case
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2013.12.001group, as opposed to the control sample. Provenance of that table
would consist of the statistical algorithms used, their parameteri-
sation, data cleaning that was applied, case and control definitions,
and information about the data provider or the data gathering pro-
cess used. In some circumstances, a part of the processmay change
over time (e.g. tweaking the case definition), causing the result to
change, and the provenance trace can provide clear information
about how the result was obtained and how it may be repeated or
improved.
Provenance is directly contributing to several important goals
that research methodologies are trying to attain. In itself, prove-
nance traces make the research process auditable, by providing
a standardised account of actions that unfolded during the pro-
cess execution. Combined with a formal model, such as a business
2 V. Curcin et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 34 (2014) 1–16Fig. 1. OPM and PROV type graphs showing available kinds of nodes and edges in each language.workflow specification, provenance ensures the results are verifi-
able. Finally, when the program executables are provided together
with the data used, they jointly ensure reproducibility of the re-
search.
Biomedical research is characterised by the heterogeneity of the
research teams participating in projects, procedures they follow,
and the data they produce. A drug development pipeline would
span a range of disciplines from target identification via detection
of candidate genes for drugs, to clinical studies exploring the effi-
cacy and drug safety. The need to capture details of data produced
at each step and the processes involved is persistent throughout
this process and benefits from common technical frameworks that
span different scientific domains andmultiple teams. For example,
collaborative workflows [2] have proven to be highly useful in in-
tegrating microarray analysis with low-level gene annotation.
Auditability and verifiability of research data are also essential
components of data management in clinical research, due to the
sensitivity and importance of its impact on saving lives. This
is reflected in popular standards such as GxP (including Good
Clinical Data Management Practice and Good Clinical Practice) [3],
CONSORT for trial reporting [4], and STROBE [5] for reporting
observational studies. Of particular interest is ADAM [6], produced
by the Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium (CDISC),
which documents each derived variable (treatment, outcome, or
covariate) used in clinical trial analysis datasets, to enable review
and re-creation of published research. All of these standards
take a retrospective view of data provenance, as something that
needs to be collected and described post-hoc. As will be shown,
successful provenance implementations adopt a prospective view,
automatically collecting this information in a single repository
during the life of a research project.
Reproducibility is also the focus of The Open Data initiative [7],
which aims to make publicly generated data free and available to
everyone, in useful formats, subject to proper attribution. Another
part of that vision, directly relevant to health data management, is
that any published research study should be accompanied by the
full data that it was derived from, thus enabling the reader to verify
the results for themselves. This approach is increasingly taken up
by scientific journals [8].
In this paper, we review the implications of provenance for
biomedical research by analysing the provenance requirements
of two real-world use cases from the clinical research domain,
and propose recommendations on appropriate solutions fordeveloping provenance capacity. In particular, we chose use cases
that rely on the service oriented architecture paradigm to highlight
the importance of provenance in a complex computing system and
reveal the benefits that the provenance capacity may bring.
2. Background
The concept of provenance is well established in many
disciplines [9,10]. For example, in the study of fine art it refers to
the trusted, documented history of some work of art. Electronic
tracking of provenance was originally studied in individual
domains, including geography or library studies, or with regards
to particular technologies, such as databases or workflow systems.
It was recognised that the same issues occurred in these different
applications, and so similar solutions may apply. Simultaneously,
there was a push from many organisations and projects for a
standard approach to representing provenance, as this would
then allow systems to be developed with some guarantee that
the provenance data held would be interpretable in the future.
Furthermore, it was understood that an important effect of having
common provenance representations would be that the history of
data could be traced across multiple heterogeneous systems, as
the provenance each system recorded would be interoperable and
interconnectable with that recorded by the others.
2.1. Provenance representation models
In the early days of the provenance efforts, several generic
provenance models were proposed [11–13]. Several metadata vo-
cabularies also allowed some limited provenance information to be
expressed, particularly Dublin Core [14] or Minimum Information
About a Microarray Experiment (MIAME) [15] for gene expression
data.
Through merging the pioneering efforts of several research
groups, a community-driven provenance specification, the Open
Provenance Model (OPM) [16] became a de-facto standard rep-
resentation for provenance in many areas. OPM is a causal graph
model, with edges denoting relationships (X was caused by Y ) and
nodes representing the individual occurrences of entities. The OPM
type graph is shown on the left side of Fig. 1. OPM graphs describe
the full lineage of a piece of data in terms of multiple events (pro-
cess instances) that led to it being produced. The nodes in the graph
can be of three types: artefacts, processes, and agents.
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version of a dataset, or a document, and are denoted by ovals in
the provenance graph.
• Processes are actions that are performed using artefacts to
generate other artefacts, e.g. a selection process uses the full set
of eligible patients and generates a subset of these with which
to conduct the trial. They are represented by rectangles in a
provenance graph.
• Agents are the entities controlling process execution, either as
human actors or as non-mutable pieces of software. They are
shown as octagons in the provenance graph.
The various properties of artefacts, processes and agents are rep-
resented by arbitrary key–value annotations to the nodes. These
annotations can include any contextual information, such as re-
garding the type, ownership, data format, etc. of the data or ac-
tivities represented by the nodes. Edges can also have annotations
to provide further information on how one occurrence caused an-
other.
Building on that and other work, theW3C standards body initi-
ated a working group to develop official W3C standards for prove-
nance. The PROV family of models [17], the type graph for which
is shown on the right side of Fig. 1, is based on OPM, revising and
extending it with better support for attribution and evolution of
entities over time. PROV activities denote something that occurs
over a period of time, and they both use and generate PROV enti-
ties. PROV entities are things,whether data, physical or conceptual.
Unlike OPM artefacts, entities can be mutable and have a lifetime
between being generated and being invalidated (by activities). One
entity can be a specialisation of another entity in a particular con-
text, e.g. a patient’smedical recordwith particular contents follow-
ing a consultation is a specialisation of thatmedical record as it has
existed over time. PROV agents denote that which has responsi-
bility for something, commonly a person, organisation or software
agent. They may be responsible for an activity having taken place,
or for an entity existing. The latter can be used to attribute author-
ship of some data to a person, for example. PROV also provides ba-
sic modelling infrastructure for describing data structures in the
provenance, through the use of collections and dictionaries. The
nodes and edges of a PROV graph can have attributes, which are
the data defining their value and context, e.g. the number of pa-
tients identified for a clinical trial or the title of a report.
This type of provenance is sometimes referred to as retrospec-
tive provenance, in that it captures historical data produced by
execution of some process model. Nomenclature used in [18,19]
distinguishes prospective provenance, which is the representation
of the process model that creates retrospective provenance data,
and the process provenance, which looks into the provenance of
that process model itself. This categorisation is particularly well-
suited to systems where there is a single computational artefact
producing all the provenance data, such as a scientific workflow
in a workflow management system. Then the prospective prove-
nance is captured by the workflow being used, and the process
provenance is the provenance of that workflow as it evolves over
time.
When provenance is represented by a graph model, such as
OPM and PROV, the queries are usually performed using a graph
query language with semantic extensions to integrate with the
domain of interest. Graph query languages have been extensively
investigated for applications such as semi-structured data, seman-
tic graphs, transportation networks, social networks and others. A
good overview can be found in [20]. The typical queries in such lan-
guages focus on subgraph matching, finding nodes connected by
paths, comparing and returning paths, aggregation, node creation,
and approximate matching and ranking. Early languages includeG [21] andGraphLog [22], an extension of DataLog. Object-oriented
graphmodels were introduced in languages such as GraphDB [23],
GOOD [24], Lorel [25], and Strudel [26]. UnQL [27] uses structural
recursion and a functional model to work on semi-structured data.
YAGO/NAGA [28] was developed for semantic search engines, and
contains weighting elements that are used to represent the con-
fidence of information in the query result. These languages in-
fluenced the semantics of the SPARQL language for querying RDF
graphs [29], e.g. v1.1 of the standard included the capability to
query paths using regular expressions. With RDF commonly used
for persisting provenance data, SPARQL is frequently used as the
language for querying provenance.
2.2. Provenance of biomedical software
In biomedical research, the data (genotype and phenotype
information from multiple sources), the workflow (procedures
carried out to perform the data analysis) and the log records
(recording of relevant events in those procedures) may be dis-
tributed among several heterogeneous and autonomous informa-
tion systems [30]. These information systems may be under the
authority of different healthcare actors, such as general practition-
ers, hospitals, hospital departments, etc., which form disconnected
islands of information. Provenance frameworks then take the ad-
ditional role of verifying the adherence of actors in the process to
security policies in place.
The provenance of many pieces of information, such as a count
of patients eligible for a clinical trial, is derived from data in mul-
tiple sites. Knowing the provenance of the results means having
records of what occurred at each of those sites, and integrating
these. In order for this to happen, each site’s software must gener-
ate records that canbe integrated, i.e. that are interoperable, ideally
by using the same base model.
When the tools share the same execution environment (work-
flow management system, scripting engine etc.) this model can be
based on the shared framework [31,32], but this is not an option in
the presence of heterogeneous software. Similarly affected is the
prospective provenance aspect, which cannot rely on describing a
scientific workflow or another concrete process that is generating
provenance, but has to look into more abstract structures that are
shared between multiple software systems. Thus, interoperability
is the primary driver for such a model-based approach to prove-
nance.
Just because the full details of all processes in the system, and
the data they accessed, could be documented and made accessible
to queriers, this does not mean that any particular piece of prove-
nance data should be communicated outside of a given site or that
any particular individual should have access to all provenance. The
secure provenance problem [33] is the task of providing assurances
of integrity, confidentiality, and availability to the tasks and prove-
nance records. Preserving the confidentiality of provenance data
and verifiable application of security policies associated with it, is
of particular concern to biomedical research.
The biomedical domain includes a plethora of data models
and ontologies, allowing distributed applications to share common
terminology. The vast majority of terminologies, formats, and
standards in use are publicly available and managed, a practice
stemming from the need for public and governmental scrutiny
of medical guidelines. Thus, commercial organisations focus their
business model around the data rather than proprietary formats
that would lock users into their software tools. For example,
Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium, comprised of
industrial, clinical, and research organisations, is tasked by the
US government to promote standards and interoperability in the
biomedical domain. Thus, as well as integrating the recording and
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a distributed application, the model used for provenance needs
to express concepts specific to the biomedical domain, and so be
integrated with those vocabularies and models.
Ultimately, the value of recorded provenance data in the
biomedical domain is that it provides answers to questions about
the research conducted. However, once the users start working
with provenance data, they may think of new provenance ques-
tions they could answer. Therefore, the way in which provenance
is modelled and recorded needs to be future-proof, as far as is feasi-
ble, in being able to answer provenance questions not considered
at design time.
In summary, the way in which provenance is modelled and
recorded in a biomedical research application needs to allow in-
teroperability of provenance between subsystems, provide con-
fidentiality over portions of the provenance data, be able to be
integrated with domain models, and be future proof with respect
to new provenance questions that may arise.
3. Use cases
In this sectionwe give a brief overview of two research projects,
experiences of which motivate our general recommendations that
follow. The two projects, TRANSFoRm (Translational Research and
Patient Safety in Europe) [34] and EHR4CR (Electronic Health
Records For Clinical Research) [35] are investigating the integra-
tion of data required for clinical trials and data routinely collected
in medical practice.
Clinical trials are an important part ofmedical research andnew
drug development. In a biomedical project, upon the satisfaction
of the pre-clinical trials, a set of tests have to be conducted with
patients with specific health conditions to generate safety and ef-
ficacy data. The number of patients recruited for trials has to be
sufficient such that the experiment results will be statistically sig-
nificant for examining the effectiveness of a new treatment. How-
ever, recruiting patientswith the predetermined characteristics for
a clinical trial is a time-consuming and costly process. Tradition-
ally, clinical researchers have to communicate with a number of
healthcare centres in order to find eligible patients and suitable
sites for conducting clinical trials. They then have to go on to ne-
gotiate with individual centres in order to execute the clinical trial
with the eligible patients at each centre.
TRANSFoRm focuses on general practice and makes use of
large collections of data collected therein, while EHR4CR is more
concerned with the hospital setting and integration of data from a
larger number of specialist data sources.
3.1. TRANSFoRm (Translational Research and Patient Safety in
Europe)
The TRANSFoRm project is developing a common digital in-
frastructure to support the vision of the learning health care sys-
tem [36] through integrating the data and workflows of clinical
and research domains in primary care. The project outputs in-
clude methods, models, services, validated architectures and clin-
ical demonstrations of software to support this integration. The
software has been designed as amodular collection of tools that are
deployed in three software configurations: Epidemiological Study,
Randomized Clinical Trial, and Decision Support. These configu-
rations directly support the three use cases in the project: ret-
rospective diabetes cohort study, gastroesophageal reflux disease
clinical trial, and a diagnostic support system for chest pain, ab-
dominal pain, and dyspnoea.
At the heart of the Epidemiological Study software configu-
ration is a semantically aware Query Formulation Workbench,designed to enable easy authoring of distributed searches to EHR
and other clinical data sources, using a controlled vocabulary ser-
vice and appropriate standards-based technological solutions. An
inherent problem in the design of clinical trials is preserving the
audit trail of the process through which these study eligibility cri-
teria are constructed.
The key provenance requirement in TRANSFoRm is to maintain
a uniform audit trail across the different software tools and con-
figurations, and have it comply to Good Clinical Practice guidelines
(GCP). This reflects the project’s ambition to provide infrastructure
for a wide variety of software, with shared key components: secu-
rity, privacy, vocabulary services, and provenance. The designs of
all software tools in TRANSFoRm are based on the Clinical Research
Information Model (CRIM) [37], which specifies all process flows
and data models that are required in TRANSFoRm use cases, and is
GCP-compliant. Thus, CRIM also defines the level of detail required
in the provenance traces.
3.1.1. TRANSFoRm provenance model
CRIM is provided as an Unified Medical Language System
(UMLS) model, and as such unsuitable to be directly used for
provenance representation. Firstly, its syntax is not expressed
in terms of OPM or PROV and therefore not all their con-
cepts fit the restrictions and logics behind provenance. Secondly,
UMLS does not support semantic reasoning required for causality
and temporal queries, which are both highly relevant to prove-
nance. Instead, CRIM was used as a basis for constructing the
Randomized Clinical Trials Ontology (RCTO), which placed all
the concepts and actors from CRIM into an ontological struc-
ture, with an explicit representation of processes which were
implicit in CRIM. As the next step, Randomized Clinical Trials
ProvenanceOntology (RCTPO)was defined as an extension of RCTO
with OPM provenance concepts, such as versioning relationships
between artefacts and create/edit actions, annotations of docu-
ments with their physical location, and links between agents, se-
curity information, and actions performed.
As an example, the concept of an electronic case report form is
defined in CRIM as eCaseReportForm. In RCTO, it becomes an on-
tological concept, linked to a ClinicalStudy concept, which is, in
turn, linked to a TrialProtocolDocument and an AdverseEffectPro-
cedureDocument. In RCTPO, eCaseReportForm is an instance of an
OPM artefact, and represents the form at a certain time point, with
laterGenerationThan relationships to previous and future versions,
used relations to edit tasks using it, wasGeneratedBy relations to
the create/edit process that produced it, and all the structural links
to domain concepts inherited from RCTO. Since CRIM, and conse-
quently RCTO and RCTPO, implement Good Clinical Practice guide-
lines, this enables provenance records to be used in providing parts
of the audit trail required by GCP. Full details on how individual
parts of CRIM were mapped to provenance concepts can be found
in [38].
RCTPO contains some non-domain content as well in order
to support the TRANSFoRm infrastructure middleware, message-
passing and security. All the tools or applications used in TRANS-
FoRm are registered in the provenance store database, with the
versioning and the link to the source/installation repository also
maintained. Each time a user logs into an application, his corre-
sponding agent is retrieved or generated, a userSessionArtifact and
a createdSessionProcess are generated and connected to authenti-
cation and authorisation processes. Following that, all consequent
actions by the user in the application are associated to the original
createdSessionProcess. This results in large interconnected graphs
containing full audit trail of the processes, expressed in concepts
that can be traced back to the CRIM conceptual model.
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As discussed above, the lack of a common execution environ-
ment complicates the capture of prospective provenance. Tech-
nologies such as D-PROV [39] support such provenance by relying
on workflows as a means of producing provenance data. TRANS-
FoRM did not have that option available, so the solution was to in-
troduce a higher-level abstraction of the provenance graph data,
namely, the provenance template. This construct specifies basic
conceptual units that a software tool may record in the prove-
nance repository, e.g. an edit operation on an eligibility criterion
of a study, which is derived from the model and that is translated
into a concrete provenance trace by a mapping model inside the
provenance framework.
Provenance templates in TRANSFoRm use a graph syntax
similar to OPMgraphs. The difference is that their artefact, process,
and agent nodes refer not to concrete instances in the past but
to RCTPO domain concepts that shall be used for instantiation.
Further graphical constructs are introduced to model subgraph
pattern repetitions, node information description and physical or
logical distribution of graph segments. An example of a provenance
template is shown in Fig. 2, describing a sequence of potential
edits happening on eligibility criteria that are associated with a
protocol of a clinical study. Themultiple edits of the study, protocol
and eligibility criteria are sequential repetitions, while different
user sessions can be created in parallel by multiple users and
software tool instances. A provenance graph segment createdusing
the template is shown in Fig. 3, depicting a scenario in which a
researcher, TA, created a study with the protocol and eligibility
criteria specifying that study participants should be over 60 years
and female,while the other researcher, JR,modified itwith another
protocol specifying that participants should have Body Mass Index
(BMI) over 40.
Associated with each entity is a set of annotations, so for
example, the annotations for the eligibility criteria version 57_17are:
Details for ClinicalStudyEligibilityCriteria 57_17:
WasDerivedFrom: OPMArtifact_50
WasGeneratedBy: OPMProcess_55
AnnotationTime: 2013-10-03 07:01:56
Type: ClinicalStudyEligibilityCriteria; Artifact
Id: ItInst_1150449877_1380780116960_objectA2_
rcto:ClinicalStudyEligibilityCriteria
Value: Inclusion Criteria: Age > 60; Inclusion Criteria: Gender = F
The provenance data captured in this way are stored in a
semantically annotated database for later auditing and analysis. All
provenance entities contain at least one annotation: their domain
semantic type defined in RCTPO and derived from the Clinical
Research Information Model (CRIM). The time of annotation, the
TRANSFoRm module which generated the data, and the physical
allocation of the data itself are also always available. The database
is implemented in a standard relational DBMS, but supporting
both SQL queries, and SPARQL queries that can make use of
semantic annotations. The latter is achieved through the Data-
to-Relational-Query (D2RQ) tool [40], which provides mappings
between relational schemata and OWL/RDFS ontologies.
3.1.3. Securing provenance in TRANSFoRm
Within the TRANSFoRmarchitecture, the security solution layer
is in charge of ensuring the identities of TRANSFoRm users, and
managing their allowed actions. The security layer performs this by
issuing SAML [41] assertions to authenticated clients to establish
that they are allowed to perform a certain action. The provenance
record of those actions is maintained separately from the security
layer and it contains the SAML assertion itself, which holds no
identifiable information, but allows invoking the security layer’s
API to extract additional information, e.g. why was the assertion
issued or how was the requesting user authenticated. The API
calls are managed by the security layer, which can decide whether
6 V. Curcin et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 34 (2014) 1–16Fig. 3. Provenance graph conforming to the template in Fig. 2 contains the trace of the evolution of a clinical study entity ‘CS Demo’ during the study preparation phase. Two
versions of the entity are shown in the graph: 25_17 and 80_17, each one defining a protocol along with its eligibility criteria. Both versions were created using the same
software tool, TRANSFoRm QueryWorkbench v1.1 (agent 14_1 in the graph) during two editing sessions opened by two different users (JR and TA). First version, 25_17, had
a protocol created with eligibility criteria, initially empty (CS EC 45_17) and then edited twice to specify recruitment condition Age > 60 and Gender = Female. Another
protocol (87_17) was created with eligibility criteria BMI > 40 and resulted in the new version of clinical study (CS 80_17). NB: CS and EC are label acronyms for ontological
concepts in clinical study and eligibility criteria in RCTPO, colours denote different software tools that contributed different graph fragments, yellow for Query Workbench,
blue for Authentication Framework. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)further information is available about the SAML assertion for the
user posing the question.
3.1.4. Queries and result visualisation
For auditing and querying of stored provenance data, TRANS-
FoRm provides a lightweight web-based query tool that supports
pre-designed SQL and SPARQL queries, addition of new queries,
and visual exploration of the provenance items by browsing the
graph structure. A initial set of useful queries enables users to
browse the provenance graph and retrieve information about clin-
ical trial studies. Authorised users can create, execute and share
new queries through the tool. The tool consists of two parts: Query
Collection and a Provenance Browser, as shown in Fig. 4. Predefined
queries, shown in the sidebar on the left, answer specific questions
from the provenance data, with the results displayed as tabular or
chart outputs. The queries are parameterisedwith ontological con-
cepts taken from the model, thus allowing close mapping to the
healthcare domain.
The provenance entities in the tabular results from the queries
contain hyperlinks that connect to the Provenance Browser tool
that provides interactive graphical navigation through stored
provenance graphs. The user clicks on nodes to reveal further
detail about the process through ontological annotations on each
node, thereby gaining access to the wider provenance information
surrounding the item of interest. The queries available range from
security-focused to ones detailing the clinical study processes. The
following are three query examples in the tool:
1. List all processes togetherwith their authentication certificates.
select ?p, ?said
where{
?p rdf:type opmo:Process .
?p urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion#ID ?said .
}
union
select ?p, ?said
where{?p rdf:type opmo:Process .
?p (opmo:cause/opmo:effectInverse)* ?entity .
?entity urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion#ID ?said .
2. List all the initiating processes of all the queries that were
completed on 01/04/2012. The query uses SQL for efficiency.
SELECT OPMProcess.ProcessKey
FROM OPMProcess, OPMDependences
WHERE OPMProcess.OPMProcessEndTime BETWEEN
01/04/2012 AND 02/04/2012 AND
NOT OPMDependence.OPMDependenceEffect =
OPMProcess.OPMProcessKey
3. Which databases were used to retrieve patient information
of the cases of a specific clinical trial study with the artefact
identified by clinicalStudyArtifactURI?
select ?database
where{
clinicalStudyArtifactURI rctpo:
hasEligibilityCriteria ?eligCriteria .
?p rdf:type rctpo:EligibilityCriteriaQueryExecution .
?p opmo:Used ?eligCriteria .
?p1 rdf:type rctpo:EHRDBQueryExecution .
?p1 opmo:wasTriggeredBy* ?p .
?p1 opmo:Used ?database .
?database rdf:type rctpo:eHRDatabase .
}
3.2. EHR4CR (Electronic Health Records For Clinical Research)
The EHR4CR project aims to develop an integrated reusable
solution to seamlessly connect existing clinical research platforms
and healthcare networks across multiple European countries
and legal frameworks. An EHR4CR service and data integration
platform will form an interoperable and scalable infrastructure
that connects the patient data information systems in hospitals.
The platform supports protocol feasibility study management and
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discover eligible patients within the hospitals and recruit them
for conducting clinical trials. The automated patient identification
and recruitment, and clinical trialmanagement capacitieswill help
to speed up the protocol feasibility study and patient recruitment
processes for a clinical trial and reduce the costs. The platformwill
later support clinical trial execution and adverse event reporting.
The main functionality of the EHR4CR platform is acquisition
and integration of data from distributed heterogeneous healthcare
information resources. Queries for eligible patients are issued by
clinical researchers via a web-based workbench, the queries are
distributed to endpoints (data sources at distributed hospitals) by
a query orchestrator. Each endpoint accesses a data warehouse,
which is populated with data from electronic healthcare record
(EHR) systems at each hospital using an extract–transform–load
(ETL) process. The results from each endpoint are aggregated and
returned to the researcher. The platform requiresmany supporting
services to ensure security, translation of terminology between the
different medical models used at different sources, and a registry
of endpoints, among others. Given the distributed nature of the
system and its inherent regulatory and governance issues, replicas
of each type of service are deployed in several European states.
These replicas are interconnected for enabling service integration
and data exchange with sufficient access control. This unavoidably
increases the complexity and difficulty formaintaining traceability
and auditability of system transactions. Performance, data quality,
privacy protection and regulatory compliance are among themajor
non-functional requirements.
Provenance data in EHR4CR is captured during the execution
of queries, and in the supporting data handling and access
control processes. It provides reasoning information for answering
questions that concerns data access, billing, study management,
and data quality issues. Motivating provenance questions in
EHR4CR include:
1. How did a feasibility study evolve into its current version?
2. How was a query result produced by the system?
3. How was an authorisation decision made in a system?EHR4CR takes amodel-driven data transformation approach for
populating standard hospital patient data into a data warehouse to
prepare information in a common form across hospitals, to allow
queries to be expressed, distributed and answered by the multiple
sources. Records of the ETL processes are critical for ensuring
whether, and to what extent, the data can be relied on.
The EHR4CR platform supports dynamic hospital and patient
discovery with a number of hospitals connected to the platform.
Provenance graph data is attached to each query result to explain
how the result was generated. The provenancemechanism records
which data sources were involved in answering a query, and
provenance information related to resource discovery and binding
processes to help the clinical research understand the query results
and improve the study design strategy, as it indicates what range
of sources are available or are frequently offline. The provenance
data can also be used for addressing billing issues involved in the
clinical trails.
Privacy protection and security compliance are addressed sys-
tematically in the design and implementation of EHR4CR. Data ac-
cess, authentication and authorisation processes are all recorded,
and it is intended that structured provenance data will replace
audit logs, and allowing the interlinking of locally generated au-
dit trails to facilitate improved auditability for local and cross-
platform auditing. Sensitive information is not contained in the
provenance data returned to the researcher, but is stored locally in
each subsystem in different management realms to allow auditing
and further investigation into specific issueswith finer granularity.
Finally, a clinical trial study changes over the course of time
with refinements to eligibility criteria and repeated queries to
the system. The provenance of a study can provide a visualisable
history of the study and the reasoning behind it. This requires
integrating the provenance of multiple query executions with a
record of how the study itself, at the clinical researcher’s site, has
evolved over time.
As is the case in TRANSFoRm, EHR4CR records provenance
according to templates, which specify the form of provenance to
be captured in an instance-agnostic form. This enables provenance
queries to be expressed, as the structure of provenance data is
known at design time. EHR4CR uses the W3C PROV data model
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ontologies or a common information model such as CRIM. Fig. 5
shows a provenance template for documenting the execution of
a query in a component of the platform. The security-related
processes and data are indicated in grey, and form a subgraph for
queries regarding security and access control.
In EHR4CR, provenance data is stored locally to each compo-
nent in an RDBMS. It is not stored in the form of PROV statements,
but can be exported from a component as PROV, which is used
as the transport mechanism. In particular, a non-sensitive subset
of provenance data is returned from the hospitals used as data
sources to the clinical researcher, embedded in the XML message
containing the eligibility query results. This data can then be in-
corporated with the researcher’s own provenance graph, regard-
ing the local refinement and execution of their study queries. The
result is that the researcher can query the provenance of their eli-
gibility query results in a local store.
We present below two brief examples of where provenance
is currently implemented and used in EHR4CR, particularly to
answer question 2 above ‘‘How was a query result produced by
the system?’’. These will be referred to in the following section for
illustration.
3.2.1. EHR4CR Extract–Transform–Load (ETL) use case
Each hospital EHRdatabase is different,with a different schema,
and with different quality and types of data present, and one hos-
pital can have multiple EHR databases. EHR4CR requires a com-
mon data warehouse at each site, to allow distributed querying.
The overall template for recording the provenance of these actions
is shown in Fig. 5. Because of the heterogeneity, in the ETL pro-
cess that transforms data from the EHR databases to the dataware-
house, different assumptions will be made at different hospitals.
A key purpose of provenance is to record the assumptions that
have been made in the data transformation. For example, to pre-
serve confidentiality, dates of birth will be set to the first day of
the month or year to inhibit identification of the patient. Where
data is repeated across EHR databases, the one from which a fact
is drawn must be recorded. There may be several dates associated
with a specific lab test, such as when the sample was taken, when
it was received by the lab and when the analysis was performed;
however, as the warehouse requires a single date therefore one ofthese must be chosen. Observing the provenance of an ETL process
allows users to understand what data can be relied on and to what
detail.
3.2.2. EHR4CR filtering use case
There can be no assumption that the ETL process or the
original data in the EHR systems is flawless. Therefore, during the
determination of eligible patient counts, certain clinical facts in
the warehouse may have to be discarded because, for example,
an event date was missing or a unit of measurement was not in
a standard representation. Thus a set of filters are used to exclude
incomplete or defective facts. A record of this filtering process is
part of the provenance returned to the clinical researcher. The
discarded facts cannot themselves be revealed to the researcher,
but counts of facts accepted or rejected by each filter may, so the
provenance is annotated with these counts. The counts are used
by the researcher to gauge the quality of the data and, where the
discard rate is very high, may explain why the patient counts are
low or zero. Thus, a provenance query on finding filter instances
which rejected four patients returns an RDF:
_1 rdf:type DobFilter.
_2 rdf:type Missing.
_2 IsOutcomeOf _1.
_3 rdf:type Counter.
_3 IsCounterOf _2.
_3 rdf:value 4.
The result is returned asmetadata inside the protocol feasibility
query result, and then displayed in a simplified form in the user
interface of the clinical researcher.
4. Recommendations
Based onour experience in the TRANSFoRm, EHR4CR and earlier
projects, we now present a set of recommendations concerning
how to model the provenance data, and the mechanisms for its
capture, storage, security, and querying. These are described at
a high level, to ensure they are re-useable across systems yet to
be designed, but with a rationale provided so that developers can
understand how they should apply to their own systems.
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A key aspect of healthcare software systems is the distribution
of authority and control. At the time such a system is first deployed,
the set of sources and consumers of healthcare data will not be
fixed, and those that are initially included will have their own
local policies and practices. To be able to answer provenance
questions in such a system, all parties need to record interoperable
provenance information to a common specification. Themodelling
allowedby that specification should also be rich enough to describe
the processing, exchange, ownership, temporal aspects etc. of
the data involved in a computational way, else answering the
questions over such large datasets will be infeasible.
The de-facto standard for rich, interoperable provenance data
is, currently, the Open Provenance Model (OPM). This has been
used in a wide range of systems and there are a number of publicly
available libraries and tools for it [42]. The forthcomingW3C PROV
data model (PROV-DM) and accompanying specifications provide
the first official standard. While currently in the final stage of
the standardisation process at time of writing, it is expected to
become a standard during 2013.W3Cmaintains a registry of PROV
implementations [43].We note that PROV is strongly influenced by
OPM, and differs primarily in adding flexibility for describing the
provenance of mutable resources and for conveniently ascribing
attribution, both aspects relevant to healthcare data.
Both OPM and PROV contain the basic building blocks needed
for provenance-aware applications, however they should not be
considered the final word on thematter. There is frequently a need
to represent structural domain information behind provenance
construction, and to include it in the provenance traces. D-
PROV, mentioned above, does that for workflow style applications,
capturing workflow graph structure, input/output data ports and
other relevant entities.
Recommendation 1 (Syntax). Use W3C PROV or the Open Prove-
nance Model for modelling provenance data recorded in an electronic
healthcare system. When choosing between the two, consider avail-
able tools and libraries in both systems for potential reuse or adapta-
tion.
Example: TRANSFoRm uses the RCTPO extension of OPM, con-
taining domain concepts and relationships.
Example: The EHR4CR ETL and filtering use cases both use an
extension of PROV.
Generic provenance models, such as OPM and PROV, must be
extended with a domain – or application – specific vocabulary in
order for provenance to be informative. As with any vocabulary,
usage of terminologies proprietary to individual institutions
greatly hampers interoperability. For the purposes of informative
querying, the querier must know something about the terms used
in the provenance graph.
Recommendation 2 (Vocabulary). Institutions involved in a dis-
tributed healthcare application should agree to a common vocabulary
to use in provenance constructs where possible.
Example: TRANSFoRm uses a generic interoperability data
model [44] combined with a terminology server [45] to ensure
consistency across data sources.
Example: The provenance templates used in EHR4CR filtering
and ETL processes employ a vocabulary, which is then common
across the hospital sites which locally record the provenance.
In addition to vocabularies, there is a large amount of well-
standardised information and process models to describe the
domain data (e.g. EHRs, clinical trials, drugs). Data provenance
concepts associated to concepts in standardised domain modelsshouldmaintain the semantic relations between them. Linking do-
main and provenance-awaremodels allows for a better description
of procedures and data flows, themaintenance of a bridge between
both domain and provenance data and, consequently, the possibil-
ity of performing richer queries. Models should be shared with the
community in order to facilitate data interchange and the improve-
ment of one’s own data modelling process. Provenance data have
to describe the state of a system in a particular moment, and do-
main data evolve in time, thus provenance storage modules have
to provide a mechanism for maintaining the minimal useful infor-
mation that reflects the data state, and provenance access policies
have to address the issue of restricting domain data access during
query executions.
Recommendation 3 (Domain Models). Link provenance models
and datawith domain knowledgemodels and data, respectively. These
may be expressed in the form of templates, similar in form to work-
flows or business processes, and should be sharedwith the community.
Example: TRANSFoRm RCTPO and RCTO ontologies are publicly
available and other randomised clinical trials can use them to
annotate their data, compare results and methodologies and
choose the most suitable procedures accordingly.
Note that we do not prescribe particular ontologies here. There
is a wide array of sometimes overlapping biomedicine-related
ontologies, and the choice of which to use in a given application
is separate from the decisions on provenance infrastructure. Aside
from ontologies of biomedical concepts, there will be concepts
that may be captured in the provenance, whether as typing
information on the provenance graphs, or additional context
information. In some cases, these may be common across multiple
distributed biomedical applications, e.g. due to the varying quality
of stored medical data, many applications will require filtering
of records before use by remote services, and describing this
in the provenance requires some vocabulary. Defining common
vocabularies for such cross-application provenance is certainly
beneficial, but beyond the scope of this (or any single) paper.
When considering how to model provenance, it is natural to
ask both ‘‘Are we recording the provenance in enough detail to
answer the questions that will be asked?’’ and ‘‘Are we reducing
performance and increasing storage requirements by recording too
much provenance data?’’ One observation is that it is rare that all
possible provenance questions can be known in advance: when
provenance data is present, users will realise new questions they
wish to ask. This leads to two related recommendations.
Recommendation 4 (Detail Focus). Always aim to model the detail
of what happens, including each processing step and data item
involved, rather than summary information that directly answers
current provenance questions.
Example: In the EHR4CR filtering use case, we do not simply
record a count of how many records have been filtered on which
grounds, but express the filtering process, with inputs and outputs
to/from each filter. This allows the filtering provenance to be
interlinked with the provenance of the query as a whole.
Instead of simply recording that ‘‘the figures produced in this
feasibility study are drawn from these hospital data sources’’,
because this is the primary provenance question being answered,
we recommend modelling the steps that lead from the hospital
data source to the creation of the feasibility study. Then, if
later questions about the influence of the infrastructure on the
feasibility report contents are asked, e.g. ‘‘Were there timeouts
that meant a particular data source yielded a possibly incorrect
value of zero patients?’’, then this can be answered with the given
provenance information. As there is no way to return to the past,
the question could not otherwise be answered.
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provenance somewhat, it does not answer the question of the level
of detail to record. If every step of every process is recorded to
the lowest level that is technically feasible, the performance and
storage overhead may be unacceptable. We need to determine
at what granularity the provenance should model processes. One
influence is that the medical domain includes many existing
semantically rich models and ontologies, and the contents of the
provenance and the granularity at which it is modelled should be
dictated by these as far as is feasible. From our experience, we
suggest the following additional guideline. For a methodological
approach incorporating these two related principles in provenance
recording, see our existing work in this area [46].
Recommendation 5 (Granularity). Use the existing biomedical
models and ontologies as indicators of the level of granularity of pro-
cess descriptions that users are likely to be interested in the future, and
validate it against the provenance questions known at design time.
Example: TRANSFoRm provenance graphs are defined in terms
of templates that are designed in collaboration with the software
developers, who use them to commit provenance graph fragments,
and users, who will need to analyse provenance audit trails.
Example: The EHR4CR ETL provenanceworks at the level of a set
of clinical facts of the same type and from the same source. Thus,
all diagnoses or all results of a specific lab test will have a single
provenance record if theyhailed from the same source. For a typical
data warehouse, this will run into tens or hundreds of provenance
records. If the provenance were applied to each individual fact
separately, the provenance data would likely expand, by an order
of magnitude, the original data warehouse, which may already
have over 107 rows.
A danger, when considering how to model provenance, is that
the perspective of one user group will suggest that provenance
be separated into isolated records in a way that makes it
difficult to answer queries of other groups. For example, from
the perspective of a clinical researcher, it may be natural to
consider each study having its own provenance, with no or limited
connection between these provenance records. This view may be
encouraged by the privacy and intellectual property concerns that
the author of one study should not have access to the provenance
regarding another author’s study. However, considered froma data
provider’s perspective, or that of the organisation providing the
distributed infrastructure, the division between studies is not a
relevant distinction. The same data item may be accessed within
multiple studies and, for the data provider’s audit purposes, that
is useful provenance knowledge. OPM and PROV allow, but do
not require, provenance to be modelled as a single graph, in
which all parts are interconnected, because this is an accurate
representation of what has occurred, e.g. multiple studies can use
the same data source, one study can use multiple data sources,
and they all use a common distributed infrastructure. Note that the
same thing may be identified in different ways in the provenance
recorded by different organisations/actors so linkage mechanisms
should be present.
Recommendation 6 (Connectivity). Model the provenance with the
expectation that, if brought together, it would form a single graph
describing the full, interconnected history of the system, as opposed
to being delimited into a set of isolated records. Globally unique IDs
should be used where feasible to facilitate interlinking.
Example: In TRANSFoRm, each entity in the stored graph has
a globally unique identifier, which enables connection of graphs
created by different software tools, for example Authentication
Framework and Query Workbench described above and shown as
two colours in Fig. 3.Example: In EHR4CR, each query executed has a globally unique
ID, as does each hospital. Therefore, in the EHR4CR filtering use
case each filtering step in the filtering use case can be given a
unique ID simply by enumerating the steps and combining with
the query ID, and each count produced by a filter likewise.
Provenance describes not only automated processes but also
human actions relevant to the data and models in the system.
Human interactions with the electronic system, and human
decision-making informing those interactions, are important
factors in how the system operates. For example, the approval for
patient data to be used as part of a clinical study may be affected
by decisions of doctors, the patient and potentially national bodies
and others. Understanding the provenance of particular study
results requires knowing, and so having captured, the key human
actions and decisions.
Recommendation 7 (Human Actions). Include both salient human
activities and automated processes in the model of provenance to be
captured.
Example: TRANSFoRm provenance model, RCTPO is derived
from CRIM, an information model comprising human workflows
as well as technical steps, and thus contains concepts modelling
human decisions and actions.
Example: In the EHR4CR platform, the selection of patients can
only be partially automated and can at best produce a shortlist that
would be narrowed down using clinical judgement. These clinical
decisionswill have to be recorded (the project implementation has
not reached this stage at time of writing).
More generally, we can distinguish three key aspects that
should be considered in an application’s provenance model. First,
the process flow indicates the order in which events occurred
and where an action was responsible for indirectly causing a
consequence elsewhere in the system. Second, the data flow
describes where data originates and ends up, and sometimes also
what value it has. Finally, the responsibility for actions that occur
should be considered.
Recommendation 8 (Model Elements). In designing the provenance
model, consider explicitly representing each element of the process
flows and the data flows, as well as the attributions of actions to
users. Layering ontologies is a useful approach that maintains logical
separation between these distinct elements.
Example: TRANSFoRm uses the RCTPO ontology to describe the
process structures and relationships between actions and users,
while OPM is employed as the basis for interactions between data
and actions.
There are provenance-related mechanisms in many existing
systems, including those of the individual institutions involved in
federated healthcare systems. For example, documents will often
be version controlled, auditing will occur for individual databases,
software will write logs to aid later debugging, etc. Provenance
aims to generalise over these different forms of recorded history,
each of which may contain relevant information for local and re-
mote users. The existing information could, in some cases, be in-
cluded into the provenance data through translation, e.g. relevant
entries from a database log could be parsed and translated into
OPM or PROV data. Alternatively, it could be included by refer-
ence. For example, in TRANSFoRm, the provenance graphs contain
links to logs of where authentication has occurred. The latter data
has tighter security controls applied than the provenance that links
to it.
Recommendation 9 (Reuse of Existing Data). Where feasible, inte-
grate the data captured by existing mechanisms (version control, au-
dit, logging, etc.) into the provenance record, whether by reference or
translation, to provide as rich and integrated an account as possible.
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thentication information beyond the user identifier. Authentica-
tion details are captured as a SAML [41] certificate which can be
used for further audits, if needed, outside the provenance infras-
tructure.
4.2. Capture
The optimal approach to capturing provenance depends on the
nature of the software system being observed. In the presence
of a shared execution middleware (e.g. workflow engine, query
processor), it is convenient to embed provenance support into the
middleware, and let it record every action. If such middleware
does not exist, but there is a shared process model between the
tools, each tool can submit template-based graph fragments to a
centralised service that are compliant with the model definitions.
Finally, in the absence of both the shared middleware and the
shared process models, tools themselves can be left to define their
own provenance traces, and trust that there will be a consistent
entity naming schema to allow for cross-tool queries.
Even in the latter two cases, the provenance capture function-
ality does not necessarily have to be created from scratch. Libraries
for modelling and serialising fragments of provenance within ap-
plication code exist for both OPM and PROV [42,43]. Currently, Java
has the widest support in terms of libraries, but other languages,
such as Python, have some implementations, and RDF and XML are
most supported for representing the provenance data. The advan-
tage of such libraries is that, along with the provenance models
themselves, they have a community that uses them and gives feed-
back to improve them, which a proprietary implementation would
not.
Recommendation 10 (Library Reuse). If not using shared execution
middleware with provenance capture support, make use of existing
OPM/PROV libraries to capture provenance data within your applica-
tion code.
Example: In order to minimise the code maintenance effort,
future development of the EHR4CR and TRANSFoRm provenance
infrastructures shall be using the PROVoKing library1, which was
not available at the time the project software was designed.
Recommendation 4 suggested that, because not all provenance
questions are known in advance, it is preferable to record the
key facts about what has occurred, events that occur, data used,
and individual’s responsibility, and not just the answers to the
provenance questions known at design time. As we cannot return
to the past, not documenting some event at the time it occurs
can mean that certain future provenance questions can never be
answered. This modelling decision then leads to an associated
recommendation regarding capture.
Recommendation 11 (Timely Capture). Build the runtime prove-
nance capture functionality into each step of the system processes, at
the appropriate level of granularity, using global identifierswhere pos-
sible and linking to records of preceding steps using the chosen prove-
nance model relations.
Example: TRANSFoRm software tools write template-based
provenance graph fragments as they execute, at specified time-
points.
Example: In both the EHR4CR filtering and ETL use cases, each
step of the filtering/transformation process is captured as it is
executed.
1 https://sites.google.com/site/provokinglibrary/.With regards to performance, provenance capture (as with
logging) can have an immediate and pervasive impact on execution
speed. For example, a prior study reported an overhead of just
under 10% due to provenance capture in an application [47]. This
can sometimes be mitigated by intelligent engineering, but should
not be overlooked.
Recommendation 12 (Performance Testing). Test the performance
overhead of provenance capture within a small sample part of your
application to ensure it is acceptable for your application or if the
technologies used and level of detail of model need to be modified.
Example: During development, each TRANSFoRm tool per-
formed performance tests before and after introducing provenance
support, and in some cases the frequency of provenance capture
was reduced so as not to adversely affect the performance of the
tool. Similarly, the usage of provenance templates facilitates pro-
filing various stress levels on the provenance server by simulating
the load under different usage patterns and frequencies.
4.3. Storage
Provenance graphs are the most popular way of representing
provenance information, used in both OPM and PROV, and they
can consist of thousands, even millions of nodes with associated
attributes. As such, they represent a special case of graph storage
management allowing the use of the same basic indexing tech-
niques, e.g. clustering and block partitioning, which is provided
by NoSQL databases such as Neo4J [48]. However, graph data can
also be stored in classical relational databases as well. The D2RQ
language [40] describes mappings between relational database
schemata and OWL/RDFS ontologies, allowing access to RDF views
on a relational data. Data partitioned in such a way can often be
conveniently distributed among several sites, whichmay be neces-
sary, depending on the institution’s data regulations. Furthermore,
in such a scenario, a central query resolution service is then needed
to determine if some provenance query will run across multiple
sites, and if so to resolve the node identifiers involved.
Recommendation 13 (Database Structure). Consider whether
provenance storage needs to be provided in a relational database, if
one is the standard solution in the research environment, or would an
RDF store or a NoSQL graph database be an option. Privacy and data
regulations will play an important role in deciding whether and how
best to distribute the data in a multiple site scenario.
Example: TRANSFoRm data uses several ontologies and often
needs to be queried based on terms from those ontologies, so
a D2RQ layer is used over a relational database to support such
queries.
Example: The EHR4CR ETL provenance data is currently stored
within a relational data warehouse since it affords querying the
clinical data and its provenance data by the same mechanism,
i.e. SQL and querying is less dependent on ontological terms.
Provenance capture is data storage of the same kind as any
other data storage in the application. For example, eligibility cri-
teria query results will be received and stored at a researcher’s
site, while a copy of the query will be cached at the hospital for
auditing. It makes sense, therefore, to reuse application function-
ality for provenance capture. In some cases, it makes sense to store
provenance data centrally, e.g. the storage and maintenance of
provenance information may be considered a matter for middle-
ware rather than clients. This means events can be documented
remotely to where they occur.
Recommendation 14 (Data Infrastructure). Reuse existing applica-
tion infrastructure for provenance transmission if storing provenance
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transmit data reliably and asynchronously between application sites.
Example: TRANSFoRm provenance data is stored centrally, and
transmitted via the existing middleware web service infrastruc-
ture.
Example: In the EHR4CR filtering provenance use case, the
provenance captured by the hospital is encoded as RDF and is
attached to the XML message containing the query results that
is returned to the clinical researcher. No additional transmission
infrastructure needed to be implemented.
Provenance data will grow over time at the rate that depends
on the patterns of graph segments that applications use [49]. For
example, re-running an existing ETL process would create fewer
new nodes than the creation of a new clinical trial. Therefore,
it is important to profile the frequency of various provenance-
generating actions. With regards to optimising storage use,
deletion policies may need to be devised to periodically remove
data deemed unnecessary for meeting regulations. To ensure that
the remaining data is still useable, it is advisable to maintain
interlinked provenance graphs when deleting data. For example,
even if deleting much of the detail about how an old EHR4CR
feasibility studywas executed, such as towhich hospitals the query
was sent and what statistics were returned, it may be valuable to
keep the link between the query and its results in the provenance
graph, as this connection is used in historic queries, e.g. looking
into rates of query success.
Recommendation 15 (Rate of Growth). Due to the typically large
size of provenance data collected over time, it is crucial to establish
early on the rate at which provenance storage requirements are ex-
pected to increase over time. The level of detail in the model may need
to be adjusted accordingly and some deletion/archiving procedures in-
troduced.
Example: The usage of provenance templates in TRANSFoRm
enables reliable estimates of growth based on the application
usage profile, since the size of provenance data committed in each
template is known.
4.4. Security
A new set of security considerations arises for provenance data
in relation to regulating access to records of a resource, rather than
the resource itself, e.g. whether a user is allowed to access the
provenance trail of a certain process, or of a process affecting a
certain data item. Even if a data item itself is not accessible to the
user, this should not necessarily restrict the user from accessing
some information about it—an auditor may not be allowed to see a
patient’s full electronic health record, but may see that the patient
was entered into a clinical trial. Therefore, the policy for access to
the provenance data items, while influenced by the access policy
to subject data items, is not necessarily identical to it.
Recommendation 16 (Permissions). When implementing prove-
nance access control, consider the differences in access permissions
between concrete data, and provenance records of that data.
Example: As part of its security system design, TRANSFoRm has
produced an Operational Security Policy document, containing an
access control model, which explicitly addresses both the various
types of data and the provenance records of those data.
Since provenance data are typically stored in relational
databases or RDF stores, one approach to access control is to leave
the access control to the storage security mechanisms. Security
for database technologies has been studied extensively in the past
(see [50] for an overview) and the increasing need for maintainingsemantic resources has developed a large set of works focused on
security for RDF data [51–53].
Specific policies for provenance data can be implemented
either by using either a dedicated provenance access control
language [54–56], or an existing standard such as OASIS eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML). Since XACML is not
generally suitable for RDF data [57,54,58–60], extensions to it are
necessary [61,60].
A key feature of a provenance access control language is a
mechanism to obfuscate the parts of the graph which the user is
not allowed to view, but which are deemed safe with the details
omitted [62]. This canbedoneby, for example, introducing abstract
entities and processes, and by anonymising certain nodes. Such a
mechanism needs to transform the provenance graph based on the
access privileges of the user posing a query, hiding or abstracting
certain parts, before assembling the query response from the
transformed graph. Similarly, the ProPub system [63] computes
views over provenance graphs for the purpose of publication by
satisfying a set of privacy requirements, specified by the user
in terms of anonymising, abstracting, and hiding certain graph
segments.
Recommendation 17 (Restrictions). When designing an access
control mechanism for provenance data, decide whether restricted
provenance information should be completely hidden or just have
details abstracted. If the latter is the case, a mechanism is needed for
answering user queries using graphs restricted to that user’s access
level.
Example: TRANSFoRm has designed a method for abstracting
portions of the provenance graph when answering queries so as
to maximise the amount of information required, while observing
the security constraints [64].
Example: By using counts, the EHR4CR filtering provenance
data provides useful information about data quality whilst not
compromising the confidentiality of patient data.
By its nature, provenance data may act as an additional layer
of security control, that is semantically enabled and thus more
closely linked to the application’s domain logic. For example, an act
of extracting data from a data source may need to have record of
the authorisation made to allow that access. However, duplication
of sensitive data, such as usernames and passwords, is rarely
desirable or, indeed, feasible, and so a solution needs to be found
to link security data with provenance records.
Recommendation 18 (Sensitive Data). When provenance is used to
capture data about the actions of the security layers, separation of
functionality needs to be introduced to avoid inadvertently exposing
sensitive data. One way of doing so is by providing token identifiers
which can then be used to request detail from the security mechanism.
Example: In TRANSFoRm, each application can use the prove-
nance API to annotate the data provenance details and link them
to its domain data in an encrypted format. The access to this en-
crypted domain data, e.g. user authentication details, has to be ap-
proved by the relevant module, typically the security layer or the
application that has performed the provenance capture.
4.5. Querying and visualisation
Provenance data is potentially accrued through every use of
tools in a software system, and the scale of collected data intro-
duces a degree of complexity when designing user-facing analyt-
ics. The analysis and reporting on provenance data can be done by
simply executing predefined queries based on some pattern and
presenting themgraphically, e.g. what are the properties of a query
V. Curcin et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 34 (2014) 1–16 13used to recruit patients for a particular clinical study, or how was
a particular process instance authenticated.
An important issue when designing the provenance data
queries is to allow for the predefined queries to evolve and be ex-
tendedwith new queries. Introducing user mechanisms for adding
queries to the system ensures that new questions can be asked
from the data as the understanding of the system increases.
Recommendation 19 (Extensibility of Queries). Introduce mecha-
nisms for dynamically adding newprovenance queries to the software.
Example: TRANSFoRm provenance query tool provides several
categories of parameterised queries, defined in SPARQL. These
queries are accessible in an XML configuration file on the server,
where a systemadministrator can simply addnew items as needed.
Further value in querying is provided by allowing the user
to examine provenance graphs by posing open-ended queries
and following the trail of the processes and data instances to
find out a greater detail of the process. This mode of interactive,
iterative querying can be supported using visualisations based on
the graphical representation of provenance data. Granularity of
the queries needs to be considered as well: a common pattern is
to start with a high-level query and then gradually narrow the
query down, which should be reflected in the query tool design.
Care needs to be taken when designing the user interface not to
overwhelm the user with the scale of the conceptual graph they
are traversing.
Recommendation 20 (Interactive Querying). Provenance data can
be used to answer individual queries or create tabular and graphical
reports, but added value can be obtained by exploiting the graph
representation of provenance to support open-ended, investigative
querying.
Example: TRANSFoRm provides a query interface which sup-
ports a graph view of the provenance entities in the response,
allowing the user to browse their surrounding and gain deeper
understanding by directly examining the entity annotations.
If the underlying data store, relational or non-relational, has ex-
plicit support for OPM nodes and edges, it is possible to separate
queries that depend on domain’s semantic annotations, e.g. con-
cepts from a clinical terminology of some hospital in EHR4CR, and
those that are purely expressed in terms of provenance concepts
(all items using a certain dataset). The latter can often be optimised
by breaking the abstraction and encoding them directly in the raw
query language of the database used.
Recommendation 21 (Breaking Abstraction). When creating prove-
nance queries, whether for atomic questions, or for navigating the
provenance graph space, try to find queries that can be optimised by
being directly formulated in the underlying query language and inves-
tigate whether the performance gain warrants this.
Example: TRANSFoRm uses D2RQ to provide a SPARQL interface
to a relational data store where the provenance data resides.
While most queries are posed in SPARQL, there are some frequent
operations that are directly implemented as SQL for efficiency
purposes. Typical example are the TRANSFoRm live activity,
reporting portal components which may be in constant use by
multiple users.
Example: In the EHR4CR ETL case, the provenance is abstracted
and kept in the data warehouse’s SQL database. Instead of putting
the provenance graph itself in the database, there is a well-defined
mapping from the columns in the database to a provenance graph
(following a template).5. Conclusions
The software landscape in biomedical research is vast and
disconnected, encompassing electronic health record systems,
genetic data repositories, clinical trial systems, and diagnostic
support systems, among others. Research tasks are executed by
numerous actors, including researchers and clinical staff, from
multiple organisations and with different data governance restric-
tions. In order to ensure that the research results are auditable,
verifiable, and reproducible, the provenance of both data and pro-
cesses involved needs to be captured in a consistent, interoperable,
confidentiality-preservingmanner across all software tools used in
the research task.
While progress has been made in developing standardised,
extensible, flexible provenance models suited to represent this
provenance data, this alone does not mean that the way to model,
capture, securely store andquery provenance in a given application
is a trivial problem. In addition, there are multiple levels of
modelling involved, starting from low-level provenance specific
constructs, to higher level ones that correspond to domain and
application concepts that are often taken from existing models.
Developers need not only to know which technologies to use, but
what principles to follow in their designs.
In this paper, we have laid out a set of recommendations for im-
plementing provenance through analysing our experience in de-
veloping two large-scale biomedical research systems. These are
notmeant to be definite and immutable, but rather a starting point
for researchers that will eventually be enriched and improved by
contributions of others. Ultimately, as the provenance technology
matures, this work will give rise to more formal software engi-
neering techniques that will facilitate provenance implementation
across a broad range of software tools in the biomedical domain
and beyond.
Overview of recommendations
1. Syntax
Use W3C PROV or the Open Provenance Model for modelling provenance data
recorded in an electronic healthcare system. When choosing between the two,
consider available tools and libraries in both systems for potential reuse or
adaptation.
2. Vocabulary
Institutions involved in a distributed healthcare application should agree to a
common vocabulary for describing provenance entities where possible.
3. Domain models
Link provenance models and data with domain knowledge models and data,
respectively. These may be expressed in the form of templates, similar in form
to workflows or business processes, and should be shared with the
community.
4. Detail focus
Always aim to model the detail of what happens, including each processing
step and data item involved, rather than summary information that directly
answers current provenance questions.
5. Granularity
Use the existing biomedical models and ontologies as indicators of the level of
granularity of process description that users are likely to be interested in the
future, and validate it against the provenance questions known at design time.
6. Connectivity
Model the provenance with the expectation that, if brought together, it would
form a single graph describing the full, interconnected history of the system,
as opposed to being delimited into a set of isolated records. Globally unique
IDs should be used where feasible to facilitate interlinking.
7. Human actions
Include both salient human activities and automated processes in the model of
provenance to be captured.
8.Model elements
In designing the provenance model, consider explicitly representing each
element of the process flows and the data flows, as well as the attributions of
actions to users.
(continued on next page)
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Where feasible, integrate the data captured by existing mechanisms (version
control, audit, logging, etc.) into the provenance record, whether by reference
or translation, to provide as rich and integrated an account as possible.
10. Library reuse
If not using shared execution middleware with provenance capture support,
make use of existing OPM/PROV libraries to capture provenance data within
your application code.
11. Timely capture
Build the runtime provenance capture functionality into each step of the
system processes, at the appropriate level of granularity, using global
identifiers where possible and linking to records of preceding steps using the
chosen provenance model relations.
12. Performance testing
Test the performance overhead of provenance capture within a small sample
part of your application to ensure it is acceptable for your application or if the
technologies used and level of detail of model need to be modified.
13. Database structure
Consider whether provenance storage needs to be provided in a relational
database, if one is the standard solution in the research environment, or would
an RDF store or a NoSQL graph database be an option. Privacy and data
regulations will play an important role in deciding whether and how best to
distribute the data in a multiple site scenario.
14. Data infrastructure
Reuse existing application infrastructure for provenance transmission if
storing provenance centrally rather than at each site. Messaging systems may
be used to transmit data reliably and asynchronously between application
sites.
15. Rate of growth
Due to the typically large size of provenance data collected over time, it is
crucial to establish early on the rate at which provenance storage
requirements are expected to increase over time. The level of detail in the
model may need to be adjusted accordingly and some deletion/archiving
procedures introduced.
16. Permissions
When implementing provenance access control, consider the differences in
access permissions between concrete data, and provenance records of that
data.
17. Restrictions
When designing an access control mechanism for provenance data, decide
whether restricted provenance information should be completely hidden or
just have details abstracted. If the latter is the case, a mechanism is needed for
answering user queries using graphs restricted to that user’s access level.
18. Sensitive data
When provenance is used to capture data about the actions of the security
layers, separation of functionality needs to be introduced to avoid
inadvertently exposing sensitive data. One way of doing so is by providing
token identifiers which can then be used to request detail from the security
mechanism.
19. Extensible queries
Introduce mechanisms for dynamically adding new provenance queries to the
software.
20. Interactive querying
Provenance data can be used to answer individual queries or create tabular
and graphical reports, but added value can be obtained by exploiting the graph
representation of provenance to support open-ended, investigative querying.
21. Breaking abstraction
When creating provenance queries, whether for atomic questions, or for
navigating the provenance graph space, try to find queries that can be
optimised by being directly formulated in the underlying query language and
investigate whether the performance gain warrants this.
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